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Figure 2.7: Automotive global market shares in 2000, 2006 and 2014 using data from the International Organization of 













































































Figure 2.13:  Employment in the United States from the automotive industry by manufacturer.  Data from American 
Automotive Policy Council 
 











































Debt-to-equity	ratios	can	either	take	the	form	of	a	numerical	figure	or	as	a	percentage	(!"#$%! ∗ 100%).		If	a	firm’s	debt-to-equity	ratio	is	greater	than	1	(100%)	the	firm	has	more	debt	than	equity	and	may	be	a	risky	investment.		 As	the	American	auto	companies	continued	to	borrow	more	and	participate	in	risky	lending	beginning	around	1990,	their	debt-to-equity	ratio	was	representative	of	their	financial	practices.		Looking	at	figure	3.3	below,	the	debt-to-equity	ratios	of	Ford	is	well	above	that	of	the	foreign	firms.		Capital-intensive	industry	such	as	automobile	manufacturing	typically	has	higher	D/E	ratios	than	other	industries.		The	D/E	ratio	of	Japanese	and	German	automakers	is	much	below	that	of	Ford,	showing	that	the	US	firm	had	a	different	business	model	than	foreigners.		Honda,	Toyota	and	Volkswagen	all	have	debt-to-equity	ratios	around	1,	paralleling	Maverick’s	statement	above	about	a	healthy	ratio.		However,	Ford	currently	has	a	D/E	ratio	three	to	four	time	that	of	these	foreign	automakers.		Ford	also	has	enormous	jumps	between	2006-2012	due	to	the	large	amount	of	capital	it	borrowed	in	2006	and	the	overall	financial	crisis	over	the	period.		
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Figure	3.3:	Debt-to-Equity	ratios	of	American	and	foreign	automakers.		Graph	powered	by	YCHARTS		 	Figure	3.4	illustrates	the	D/E	ratios	of	the	other	two	US	automakers	from	the	mid	1990s	to	20152.		This	graph	uses	data	from	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	annual	reports.		Both	companies	were	restructured	after	the	bailout	and	Chrysler	changed	ownership	from	Daimler	to	Fiat.		This	is	represented	through	the	fluctuations	and	jumps	in	the	data.3		While	the	numbers	are	on	average	below	that	of	Ford	above,	both	companies	are	still	substantially	higher	than	the	Japanese	and	Germans.		The	annual	reports	presented	by	GM	and	Chrysler	are	illusive	and	display	characteristics	of	firms	hiding	debt	and	assets	as	discussed	earlier.		General	Motors	generally	reported	very	low	levels	of	debt	while	disguising	the	majority	under	GMAC.		Similar	is	true	for	Chrysler	and	Chrysler	Capital.		Both																																																									2	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	are	separated	from	figure	3.3	because	of	limited	information	due	to	the	company	restructuring	after	the	2009	bailout.	3	General	Motors	2002	value	affected	by	high	pension	liabilities	and	therefore	assessed	using	varied	formula	
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of	these	financing	arms	are	shadow	banks	for	the	manufacturers.		The	higher	levels	of	debt	that	the	Americans	have	over	the	foreign	brands	shows	they	are	financing	more	based	on	borrowed	money.		
Figure	3.4:		Debt-to-Equity	Ratios	for	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	from	1995-2015		 Figure	3.5	below	displays	the	asset-backed	securities	issued	by	auto	manufacturers	between	2000-2015.		“An	asset-backed	security	(ABS)	is	a	financial	security	backed	by	a	loan,	lease	or	receivables	against	assets	other	than	real	estate	and	mortgage-backed	securities”	(Asset-Backed	Securities	–	ABS).		These	numbers	represent	the	number	of	loans	and	leases	being	issued	by	automotive	companies.		The	automakers	would	then	sell	these	loans	to	banks	in	the	form	of	securities.		This	is	the	process	of	outsourcing	as	discussed	previously.		The	steep	rise	in	ABSs	between	2000	and	2005	is	reflective	of	the	easy	credit,	
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high	housing	prices	and	strong	economic	climate.		This	created	increased	demand	for	new	vehicles	and	the	carmakers	were	happy	to	issue	more	loans.		However,	the	economy	weakened	after	this	point	leaving	consumers	with	depreciated	vehicles	they	could	not	pay	off.		“A	serious	recession	might	cause	many	car	owners	to	default	on	their	car	payments	to	GMAC,	and	thus	leave	the	owners	of	the	asset-backed	security	without	the	promised	cash	flows.		This	happened	quite	often	in	2007-2009”	(Block,	Hirt,	and	Danielsen	242).		If	financial	institutions	were	borrowing	short-term,	which	the	American	auto	companies	were	doing,	they	would	then	lack	the	cash	flows	to	repay	their	obligations.		This	is	how	the	automakers	began	dealing	in	Ponzi	finance	as	they	relied	on	cash	flows	to	repay	interest	as	well	as	the	value	of	their	obligation.		Lacking	the	income,	the	system	failed	to	be	maintained	and	collapsed	inward	on	the	Big	Three.			
	
Figure	3.5:		Automotive	ABS	issuances	from	2000-2015	
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	After	2005	there	is	a	substantial	fall	in	figure	3.5,	indicating	a	decreasing	number	of	ABSs.		This	was	due	to	falling	demand	along	with	the	inability	of	the	automakers	to	get	the	financing	to	make	loans.		The	fall	is	also	prevalent	in	figure	3.6	that	shows	the	change	in	issuances.		There	is	a	steady	decline	in	the	number	from	2006	to	2010.		After	years	of	firms	issuing	fewer	and	fewer	loans,	the	Fed	began	the	Term	Asset-Backed	Securities	Loan	Facility	(TALF)	program	to	help	the	flow	of	credit.	(Felkerson).		This	allowed	automakers	and	other	financial	institutions	to	increase	the	issuance	of	loans,	and	therefore	asset-backed	securities.		This	is	illustrated	in	both	figures	as	the	program	succeeded	in	increasing	the	number	of	asset-backed	securities.		If	this	program	had	not	been	put	in	place,	it	is	certain	ABSs	would	have	continued	to	decline.		When	the	TALF	program	ends	around	2012,	the	ABS	issuances	slow	down.	
	
Figure	3.6:		Percent	change	in	auto	ABS	issuances	from	previous	year	
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	These	figures	are	clear	indicators	that	the	American	automakers	had	spread	into	a	wider	industry.		The	money	manager	control	diverged	the	US	firms	further	from	manufacturing	and	closer	to	the	banking	sector.		Acting	to	achieve	high	profits,	the	Big	Three	became	consumed	with	issuing	loans	and	accumulating	debt.		Their	practices	grew	more	and	more	risky	until	there	was	no	way	to	sustain	the	debt	system.		This	led	to	the	crash	during	the	financial	crisis.		Contrary	to	popular	belief,	the	financial	crisis	was	not	the	cause	of	the	auto	bailout	but	just	a	factor	that	contributed	to	the	final	descent.			 	
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Conclusion	
	 The	American	automotive	CEOs	argued	that	it	the	fault	of	the	economy	as	a	whole	that	the	Big	Three	had	fallen	to	the	brink	of	failure.		It	is	clear	now	that	this	was	false	and	the	companies	themselves	drove	themselves	into	the	ground.	The	performance	of	the	three	companies	in	relation	to	that	of	the	whole	economy	indicated	the	automakers	were	underperforming	because	of	unique	problems.		Years	of	short-term	views	and	big	business	strategy	limited	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	from	the	big	picture	of	the	automotive	industry.		However,	it	was	not	exclusively	the	traditional	issues	of	industrialization	that	drove	the	decline	but	a	new	stage	of	capitalist	financialization.		 Focusing	short-term,	the	US	automakers	overly	compensated	their	business	techniques	with	large	vehicles	and	SUVs.		They	were	not	able	to	compete	with	the	efficiency	of	Japanese	or	German	firms	in	producing	small	cars	but	saw	an	opening	in	the	large	car	market.		The	Americans	were	able	to	generate	much	higher	profit	margins	producing	SUVs	and	did	not	have	strong	foreign	competition	in	the	90s.		The	low	oil	prices	allowed	them	to	sell	mass	amounts	of	these	vehicles	and	the	money	managers	encouraged	high	asset	turnovers	to	increase	return	on	equity.		On	top	of	this,	increased	debt	caused	the	firms	to	become	more	risky.		This	increased	the	financial	leverage	of	the	US	automakers	and	incentivized	them	to	increase	their	financial	business	instead	of	their	manufacturing	sector.		Innovation	suffered	because	of	this	and	made	the	Big	Three	fall	further	behind	foreign	competition.		The	US	carmakers	therefore	fell	apart	because	of	the	backward	system	of	taking	financial	priority	above	manufacturing.			
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Financialization	proved	to	be	a	profitable	yet	harmful	characteristic	of	the	American	auto	big	business.		Though	this	lead	up	to	what	Minsky	calls	a	natural	bailout,	the	automakers	do	not	appear	to	be	learning	from	their	mistakes.		In	a	Reuters	article	written	by	Bernie	Woodall,	Ben	Klayman	and	Paul	Lienert	in	August	2014,	the	three	stated	that	risky	automotive	lending	has	increased	since	the	2009	bailout.		Before	the	financial	crisis,	subprime	home	loans	grew	out	of	control	from	a	lack	of	regulation	and	oversight.		Now,	the	regulatory	agencies	have	a	firm	hold	on	home	loans,	so	banks	are	instead	changing	their	sights	on	auto	loans.		There	is	much	less	regulation	on	unsuspecting	auto	loans	and	we	are	seeing	a	rise	in	subprime	loans.		“General	Motors	Co	(GM.N)	is	among	several	automakers	recording	growth	in	subprime	lending,	to	borrowers	with	credit	scores	of	less	than	620”	(Woodall,	Klayman,	Lienert).		The	capitalist	system	of	financing	continues,	as	there	are	profits	to	be	made.		These	subprime	auto	loans	may	soon	bubble	up,	leading	to	the	next	economic	recession	since	the	burst	of	the	housing	bubble	in	the	2007.			 	
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